Gas Performance
Assurance Framework
Incentive Regime
(Mod 483)

PAW April 2014









Gas Performance Assurance Framework Intensive Regime

Elements of the change

- 1. Identify the system and data to measure and monitor industry performance Nexus monthly data and reporting
- 2. Establish appropriate incentive model Independent study
- 3. Establish appropriate incentive rate and target Model output is a p/kWh rate and % target
- 4. Determine appropriate mechanism for the incentive re-allocation Incentive pot and invoicing
- 5. UNC Performance Assurance Sub-committee
 Creation of a UNC PAS to oversee arrangements



1. Identify the system and data to measure and monitor industry performance

Principles

- Shipper organisation's collective portfolio data measured
- Data extracted from Nexus system
- Reported monthly

AQ Allocation / Energy Reconciled = % reconciled



2. Establish appropriate incentive model

Ofgem are leading procurement of an Independent Study

- Create a model to determine equitable redistribution of cost based on risk presented (size in kWh and age of un-reconciled energy are expected to be the key attributes of the model)
- Detail of what needs to be measured to ensure accuracy of inputs (e.g. Transporter offtake metering, shrinkage, Shipper-provided meter readings, AQ calculation rates)
- Full documentation of the methodology and supporting information and assumptions

The model is to be approved by the Performance Assurance Workgroup or relevant UNC Sub-committee



Establish appropriate incentive rate and target

The model output will populate the below table

[Transporters] will manage model annually and be obligated to populate the table

UNC Performance Assurance Incentive (PAI) Table format


<u>Year</u> <u>2015</u> <u>2016</u> <u>2017</u> <u>2018</u>	p/kWh	<u>%target</u>
<u>2015</u>		
<u>2016</u>		
<u>2017</u>		
<u>2018</u>		
<u>2019</u>		
<u>Etc</u>		



Determine appropriate mechanism for the incentive re-allocation

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The Performance Assurance Target (PAT) will be measured against a rolling 12 month performance, for each shipper organisations collective portfolio.



Scenario 1

Only compliant parties receive incentive smear

Scenario 2

Polluter pays Mod 640 model

Scenario 3

Total monthly pot is allocated by AQ allocation market share to all parties

<u>Incentive allocation scenarios</u>						
<u>Shipper</u>	Allocation	<u>PAT</u>	Pays in (£)	Scenario 1	Scenario 2	Scenario 3
	(kWh)	<u>Compliance</u>		<u>(£)</u>	<u>(£)</u>	<u>(£)</u>
<u>A</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>50</u>
<u>B</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>90</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>25</u>
С	25	No	10	0	45	25

UNC Performance Assurance Sub-committee

Principle

- The Performance Assurance Sub-committee (PAS) will be established to review and manage the Performance Assurance regime
- The PAS will be a sub-group of the UNCC
- The powers of the PAS include
 - Contract with third parties e.g. new independent report
 - Review the process and recommend any improvements
 - Request audits of the process
 - Raise new PA modifications
 - Suspend the PA process

