

**TRANSCO NETWORK CODE MODIFICATION PROPOSAL No. 0589**  
"Revisions to entry capacity overrun charges ahead of next auctions"  
Version 1.0

**Date:** 30/09/2002

**Proposed Implementation Date:**

**Urgency:** Non-Urgent

**Justification**

The overrun charge is applied to users who flow gas in excess of their capacity holding over the Gas Day. The current overrun regime was introduced in 1999 as part of the RGTA capacity reforms and has subsequently been reviewed and changed in the light of experience under the new regime. There has been considerable debate about whether capacity overrun charges are too high.

Overrun charges are designed to provide an incentive on shippers to pre-book capacity (the so-called 'ticket to ride' principle). Overrun charges should ensure that shippers who flow in excess of booked capacity are exposed to the costs they impose on Transco and other users (through capacity neutrality). Transco can incur significant costs if Transco has to use capacity management tools as a result of shippers flowing gas without securing capacity.

The current overrun charge is too high and in achieving this objective the charge significantly and artificially raises the risks that shippers face in booking and trading capacity. The eight times multiple is arbitrary and does not reflect the costs to Transco and/or users associated with capacity overruns. The use of a smaller multiple of market prices would be more cost-reflective whilst maintaining the incentive to pre-book capacity. The multiple will also maintain a strong incentive on shippers not to overrun at constrained system entry points.

The overrun regime may affect shippers' valuations of monthly system entry capacity. Any proposed change to the level of overrun charges should ideally be decided upon before the proposed long term capacity auctions that are currently due to be held in January 2003.

**Nature of Proposal**

The current entry capacity overrun charges should be amended before the next set of MSEC auctions to remove the eight times multiple of monthly auction prices from the calculation and replace it with a multiple of 1.1 times the monthly auction prices. The other elements of the overrun calculation should remain unchanged.

The change to the overrun charge should take effect from 1 April 2003.

## **Purpose of Proposal**

This modification would better facilitate the relevant objectives by ensuring more efficient utilisation and operation of the pipeline system. By increasing incentives to trade and decreasing incentives to hoard capacity, it will lower capacity management and trading costs and prices.

The modification will also better facilitate competition between shippers and suppliers by making it easier to bring gas to market through the creation of a more liquid secondary capacity market.s

## **Consequence of not making this change**

Maintaining the current level of overrun charges will stifle capacity trading and liquidity in secondary markets. It will also continue to artificially raise the risk to shippers associated with trading capacity. This will lead to higher prices associated with capacity in secondary markets. This will also raise the cost of capacity management to Transco. Customers will ultimately face these additional costs.

Increased risk will reduce the willingness to shippers to trade capacity. This could encourage capacity hoarding to manage this risk. As it is not possible to design a fully effective use-it-or-lose-it regime, this could prevent gas reaching the market and competition to supply gas to the market.

## **Area of Network Code Concerned**

Section B

## **Proposer's Representative**

Stephen Charles Smith (AEP Energy Services Ltd)

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## **Signature**

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