

**Workstream Report**  
**Changes to the Reasonable Endeavours Scheme**  
**to better incentivise the detection of Theft**  
**Modification Reference Number 0231**  
Version 0.3

This Workstream Report is presented for the UNC Modification Panel's consideration. The Distribution Workstream considers that the Proposal is sufficiently developed and should now proceed to the Consultation Phase. [The Workstream also recommends that the Panel requests the preparation of legal text for this Modification Proposal].

## **1 The Modification Proposal**

### **Background**

At the end of August 2006 the Energy Retail Association (ERA) and the Energy Networks Association (ENA) jointly established a Workgroup to look at how participants in the Gas and Electricity markets might promote the detection, investigation and prevention of energy theft.

The Development Group produced a final proposals document in June 2007, which was submitted to Ofgem. As part of the Workgroup Groups' findings it was agreed that participants are not sufficiently commercially incentivised under the current regime to investigate, detect and prevent theft.

It was agreed that where there are arrangements in place to mitigate the costs of investigating theft, the process is burdensome and does not adequately cover the costs incurred by participants in investigating theft, and in some cases does not cover the administrative costs associated with making a claim.

In their document titled 'Theft of Electricity and Gas – Next Steps – 06/05' dated 17th January 2005, Ofgem stated that;

*“The principles behind the Reasonable Endeavours Scheme appear to be sound basis for these arrangements. Under the Reasonable Endeavours Scheme gas suppliers and GTs are currently able to recover gas charges and other defined costs where they have undertaken reasonable endeavours to recover these from the customer but have failed to do so.”*

It is our belief that, while the current regime provides a sound basis, the level of compensation available to shippers through the Reasonable Endeavours Scheme is insufficient to incentivise increased Shipper activity to identify theft.

Furthermore, the current regime provides a perverse incentive whereby Shippers who are actively engaged in the detection of theft are exposed to the full cost of the Energy they notify as stolen, often with little chance of recovering these costs from the end user.

Whilst the Reasonable Endeavours Incentive Scheme offers Suppliers the opportunity to recover some of their costs in investigating theft, the level of compensation available does not provide sufficient incentive.

Furthermore, the Reasonable Endeavours Incentive Scheme is operated outside of the

Uniform Network Code arrangements, which we believe contributes to a lack of understanding and clarity, on the part of Shippers, around the process.

### **Proposal**

1. The current process is administered by the Transporters agency out side of any formal Governance arrangements.

This proposal would bring the current process operated by the Network Operators into the Uniform Network Code, thus creating an appropriate governance framework in which it can continue to operate.

2. The Reasonable Endeavours Scheme provides a sound framework, which if developed upon, could create a robust incentive mechanism. However, it is widely accepted that that the current levels of compensation payable under the Reasonable Endeavours Scheme do not provide sufficient incentive upon all Shippers to detect theft.

In order to provide adequate incentive, the level of compensation available to Shippers would be extended to a maximum of £1000 per occasion under this proposal.

3. The existing Reasonable Endeavours Scheme does not make any allowance for the situation where, having taken all reasonable steps to detect and report theft, Shippers are only able to recover part of their costs from the end user.

This proposal would also extend the existing arrangements to allow Shippers to recover their costs to the new maximum level where part payment has been made by the end user to the Shipper.

## **2 User Pays**

- a) **Classification of the Proposal as User Pays or not and justification for classification**

This Proposal [is/ is not] a User Pays Proposal as it amends an existing core service currently provided by Transporters

- b) **Identification of Users, proposed split of the recovery between Gas Transporters and Users for User Pays costs and justification**

[No User Pays charges applicable.]

- c) **Proposed charge(s) for application of Users Pays charges to Shippers**

[No User Pays charges applicable to Shippers.]

- d) **Proposed charge for inclusion in ACS – to be completed upon receipt of cost estimate from xoserve**

[No charges applicable for inclusion in ACS.]

**3 Extent to which implementation of the proposed modification would better facilitate the relevant objectives**

**Standard Special Condition A11.1 (a): *the coordinated, efficient and economic operation of the pipe-line system to which this licence relates;***

Implementation would not be expected to better facilitate this relevant objective.

**Standard Special Condition A11.1 (b): *so far as is consistent with sub-paragraph (a), the (i) the combined pipe-line system, and/ or (ii) the pipe-line system of one or more other relevant gas transporters;***

Implementation would not be expected to better facilitate this relevant objective.

**Standard Special Condition A11.1 (c): *so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the efficient discharge of the licensee's obligations under this licence;***

Implementation would not be expected to better facilitate this relevant objective.

**Standard Special Condition A11.1 (d): *so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) the securing of effective competition: (i) between relevant shippers; (ii) between relevant suppliers; and/or (iii) between DN operators (who have entered into transportation arrangements with other relevant gas transporters) and relevant shippers;***

By creating a robust incentive mechanism to investigate theft, this proposal would better facilitate condition A11.1(d) as it would more accurately allocate energy between Shippers, thus promoting competition.

**Standard Special Condition A11.1 (e): *so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), the provision of reasonable economic incentives for relevant suppliers to secure that the domestic customer supply security standards (within the meaning of paragraph 4 of standard condition 32A (Security of Supply – Domestic Customers) of the standard conditions of Gas Suppliers' licences) are satisfied as respects the availability of gas to their domestic customers;***

Implementation would not be expected to better facilitate this relevant objective.

**Standard Special Condition A11.1 (f): *so far as is consistent with sub-paragraphs (a) to (e), the promotion of efficiency in the implementation and administration of the network code and/or the uniform network code.***

Implementation would not be expected to better facilitate this relevant objective.

**4 The implications of implementing the Modification Proposal on security of supply, operation of the Total System and industry fragmentation**

No such implications have been identified.

**5 The implications for Transporters and each Transporter of implementing the Modification Proposal, including:**

**a) implications for operation of the System:**

No such implications have been identified.

**b) development and capital cost and operating cost implications:**

[The Proposal increases incentives and it is likely more claims will be submitted with a subsequent increase in operating costs.]

**c) extent to which it is appropriate to recover the costs, and proposal for the most appropriate way to recover the costs:**

[Transporter costs are to be recovered through its price control mechanisms.]

**d) Analysis of the consequences (if any) this proposal would have on price regulation:**

[Transporter costs are to be recovered through its transportation charges.]

**6 The consequence of implementing the Modification Proposal on the level of contractual risk of each Transporter under the Code as modified by the Modification Proposal**

No such consequence is anticipated.

**7 The high level indication of the areas of the UK Link System likely to be affected, together with the development implications and other implications for the UK Link Systems and related computer systems of each Transporter and Users**

No changes to systems would be required as a result of implementation of this Proposal.

**8 The implications of implementing the Modification Proposal for Users, including administrative and operational costs and level of contractual risk**

*Administrative and operational implications (including impact upon manual processes and procedures)*

[Additional administration costs are anticipated due to a likely increase number in

Users claims.]

*Development and capital cost and operating cost implications*

No such costs have been identified.

*Consequence for the level of contractual risk of Users*

No such consequence is anticipated.

**9 The implications of implementing the Modification Proposal for Terminal Operators, Consumers, Connected System Operators, Suppliers, producers and, any Non Code Party**

[Consumers and Suppliers are likely to benefit from the correct apportionment of energy due to the increased number of investigations.]

**10 Consequences on the legislative and regulatory obligations and contractual relationships of each Transporter and each User and Non Code Party of implementing the Modification Proposal**

[Extends Transporter obligations in the existing reasonable endeavours scheme by placing the requirements in UNC.]

**11 Analysis of any advantages or disadvantages of implementation of the Modification Proposal**

**Advantages**

- [Provides additional incentives on Users to investigate theft by increasing the level of compensation claimable.]
- [The level of compensation is more reflective to the cost of investigating theft.]
- [Provides a robust mechanism for the continued governance of the reasonable endeavours scheme.]
- [May help to improve the allocation of energy by market segment]

**Disadvantages**

- [May require additional administrative and operational resources to manage to increase in work load for Users and Transporters].
- [Increases the existing compensation values and cost of operating the existing scheme.]

**12 Summary of representations received (to the extent that the import of those representations are not reflected elsewhere in the Workstream Report)**

No written representations have been received.

**13 The extent to which the implementation is required to enable each Transporter to facilitate compliance with safety or other legislation**

No such requirement has been identified.

**14 The extent to which the implementation is required having regard to any proposed change in the methodology established under paragraph 5 of Condition A4 or the statement furnished by each Transporter under paragraph 1 of Condition 4 of the Transporter's Licence**

No such requirement has been identified.

**15 Programme for works required as a consequence of implementing the Modification Proposal**

[No programme for works has been identified.]

**16 Proposed implementation timetable (including timetable for any necessary information systems changes)**

As the proposal addresses a deficiency in present day arrangements it should be implemented as soon as possible.

**17 Implications of implementing this Modification Proposal upon existing Code Standards of Service**

No implications of implementing this Modification Proposal upon existing Code Standards of Service have been identified.

**18 Workstream recommendation regarding implementation of this Modification Proposal**

The Distribution/Transmission Workstream considers that the Proposal is sufficiently developed and should now proceed to the Consultation Phase. [The Workstream also recommends that the Panel requests the preparation of legal text for this Modification Proposal].