

Workstream Report
Quarterly NTS Entry Capacity User Commitment
Modification Reference Number 0246
Version 1.0

This Workstream Report is presented for the UNC Modification Panel’s consideration. The Transmission Workstream considers that the Proposal is sufficiently developed and should now proceed to the Consultation Phase, with the proviso that National Grid NTS provides the Panel with analysis of costs and benefits, and details the proposed User Pays arrangements. Having noted that National Grid NTS expect legal text to be issued during the consultation period, the Workstream does not recommend that the Panel requests the preparation of legal text for this Modification Proposal.

1 The Modification Proposal

Where capitalised words and phrases are used within this Modification Proposal, those words and phrases shall usually have the meaning given within the Uniform Network Code (unless they are otherwise defined in this Modification Proposal). Key UNC defined terms used in this Modification Proposal are highlighted by an asterisk () when first used.*

This Modification Proposal, as with all Modification Proposals, should be read in conjunction with the prevailing Uniform Network Code* (UNC).*

Background

Review Group 0221 “Review of Entry Capacity and the Appropriate Allocation of Financial Risk” was established in September 2008 to assess whether or not the current credit arrangements, in place for securing long term NTS Entry Capacity, were sufficiently robust and provide the correct balance of risk between various Shipper Users.

Following Review Group 221 discussions, National Grid NTS believes there are two key issues that have been identified:

1. The current UNC requirements, for Quarterly NTS Entry Capacity* (QSEC), are that a User puts in place credit arrangements to provide security for a rolling twelve month period. Thus, the obligation commences twelve months prior to the date on which the entry capacity bought in a QSEC auction becomes effective. If insufficient credit is put in place, all QSEC rights (across all ASEPs) “for the relevant quarters” lapse. Notwithstanding, National Grid NTS’s obligation to make capacity available for up to the next four quarters, a User at a single entry point would effectively be able to keep deferring capacity commitments up to twelve months prior to the event.
2. In addition to the above, the Review Group considers that there is currently an inappropriate length of time between a User committing to buy long term NTS Entry Capacity and the User financially underpinning this commitment. This could lead to a situation where, following User default or deferral of capacity commitment, the revenue associated with this User’s capacity commitment will be recovered through changes to general NTS Transportation Charges. National Grid NTS and Review Group attendees consider that the timing of the

capacity commitment and the associated financial underpinning should be more closely aligned in order to minimise the amount of associated revenues being recovered through general, i.e. non User specific, NTS Transportation Charges.

Modification Proposal

National Grid NTS has raised this Modification Proposal to address the above issues.

The following part of the Modification Proposal relates to addressing issue one:

Current security provisions set out in B2.2.15 of the UNC TPD mean that National Grid NTS looks at the sum of the User's current Relevant Code Indebtedness* and the following twelve months liability for capacity charges associated with Quarterly NTS Entry Capacity, as acquired in the auctions for Quarterly NTS Entry Capacity (QSEC) (referred to below as QSEC auctions).

If this aggregated amount exceeds 85% of the User's Code Credit Limit, then National Grid NTS will notify the User. The User can either increase its Code Credit Limit by providing additional security or be in the position where the User's Registered Quarterly NTS Entry Capacity for each of the relevant calendar quarters will lapse and the User will cease to be treated as holding the Registered Quarterly NTS Entry Capacity.

These provisions define the requirement for National Grid NTS to be provided with security for near term entry capacity, i.e. the next 12 months capacity charges that form part of the transportation invoicing arrangements and it is proposed that this provision in UNC TPD Section B2.2.15 predominantly remain in place.

However, we propose to amend UNC TPD Section B 2.2.16:

- to remove the ability for a User to defer the provision of the security required under UNC TPD Section B2.2.15 and therefore, for this User's Registered Quarterly NTS Entry Capacity to lapse;
- to clarify that the User will continue to be treated as holding the relevant NTS Entry Capacity and will be subsequently invoiced for that capacity. Any failure to pay the above invoices will be treated in the same way as any other transportation debt; and
- such that National Grid NTS will reject any further QSEC capacity bids at any ASEP submitted by the User until the above security has been provided by the User.

It is anticipated that this change will enhance current incentives for Users to submit the required security as per UNC TPD Section B2.2.15.

The following part of the Modification Proposal relates to addressing issue two:

Implementation

Within 28 days of the implementation of this proposal, it is proposed that Users will be required to put in place, and subsequently keep in place, sufficient security to underpin their existing Quarterly NTS Entry Capacity (QSEC)

holding. The level of security will be the amount determined by the entry capacity risk assessment i.e., the User's User Security Value (USV). Full details of the entry capacity risk assessment and the USV are explained later in this proposal.

The User shall provide this security via either a Deposit Deed* or Letter of Credit*. Deposit Deeds and Letter of Credits are a firm commitment to pay and cannot be amended or cancelled without agreement of all parties involved, fully covering against insolvency. Other security tools are not being considered as they do not offer the same protection in the event of insolvency.

It is also proposed that 14 days prior to participating in any subsequent auction process for Quarterly NTS Entry Capacity (QSEC), Users will be required to provide sufficient security to cover their anticipated additional capacity holding resulting from their participation in the auction. Such security amount to be determined through the application of the entry capacity risk assessment referred to above to the User's anticipated additional capacity holdings.

National Grid currently invites Users to make applications for Quarterly NTS Entry Capacity for a period of ten consecutive Business Days (unless stability has been reached) during 01 September and 30 September in a Capacity Year. Users submit capacity bids between 08:00 and 17:00 hours on an invitation date and auction information is sent to Users by 20:00 each day.

It is proposed that following closure of each QSEC bid window National Grid NTS will reject all capacity bids submitted by a User in that window where that User's revised User's Security Value reflecting both their existing holding and "anticipated" capacity allocation that would have resulted had that bid window been the final bid window, exceeds the User's prevailing security. This will ensure that a "defaulting" User's bids do not effect the reporting during the auction and are also disregarded prior to determining whether or not the auction has reached stability.

National Grid NTS also proposes that following each QSEC bid window closure that a full business day is added between the closure of this window and the opening of the next to carry out the aforementioned validation of the auction bids. It is therefore proposed that the ten consecutive Business Days is changed to eight bid windows each punctuated with one business day between the windows and that the current auction information is sent to Users by 20:00 on the business day after the bid window; to which the information relates: closes. Previous QSEC auctions have been analysed and National Grid NTS has found that stability has always been reached by the seventh consecutive day if not before. Therefore reducing the number of bid windows to eight would not have changed any previous auction and is therefore unlikely to have a material effect going forward.

To be clear, this proposal does not preclude a User providing additional security during the annual invitation period.

The security provisions proposed in this proposal are in addition to those currently within UNC TPD Section V.

Entry Capacity Risk Assessment

As detailed above, all Users with QSEC NTS Entry Capacity holdings will be

required to provide appropriate security to support their QSEC capacity holding. This security will be known as the User Security Value and will be based on a risk assessment of the Allocated Capacity Values (ACV). Each User's required User Security Value (USV) will be calculated as follows:

$$\text{USV} = \text{ACV} + \text{VAT}$$

Where:

VAT = Value Added Tax at the prevailing rate

ACV = that User's allocated QSEC NTS Entry Capacity bids at all ASEPs for all Years Y2 to Y16 inclusive multiplied by [0.1].

In order to ensure that its QSEC auction bids are allocated the User will be required, prior to the auction, to derive its post auction ACV, by estimating the (max) value of its successful capacity bids across all auction periods and to add this to the value of its existing capacity holding for Gas Years Y2 to Y16 (inclusive).

A number of options for selecting the QSEC NTS Entry Capacity bid years used to derive the ACV were investigated by the Review Group. Each option was discussed in turn and all but the one proposed in this proposal were dismissed as being capable of manipulation by auction parties. The Y2 to Y16 option put forward in this proposal was considered by the group as being the option which best balanced the conflicting aims of capturing the financial impacts of a User's commitments, whilst not unduly disincentivising long term investment signals.

The Review Group sought to further achieve the balance referred to above by reducing the value of the aggregate ACV to a proportion of Y2 to Y16, thus ensuring that the overall level of security required is proportionate to the problem and does not unnecessarily discourage Users from giving long term auction signals. It was the view of the attendees of Review Group 0221, which expressed a preference, that this proportion/percentage be 10%.

The Review Group also considered that security requirements should be further reduced depending on the Users credit rating. National Grid NTS put forward adjustment calculations that reduced the security requirements based on their Moody's credit rating or Standard and Poor's equivalent. This approach was initially incorporated within Modification Proposal 0246. However, National Grid NTS considers that any proposal which seeks to charge similar Users a different cancellation fee when recalling the same value of capacity is likely to be viewed as unduly discriminatory and therefore at odds with our licence obligations. National Grid NTS has therefore not included this element within this revised Modification Proposal.

Long Term Entry Capacity Default Process

It is also proposed that the following actions be classed as "events of User default":

1. the amount determined by the User's USV exceeds the value of the security in place; or
2. the User's supplied security tool (LoC or Deposit deed) has less than 30

days validity remaining; or

3. the credit rating of the financial institution providing the LoC has gone below the minimum credit rating specified in UNC TPD Section V.

If an “event of User default” occurs, a “default process” will be triggered whereby a notice will be issued to the User by National Grid NTS informing the User of the “event of default” and requiring the User to provide the necessary security to cover at least the User’s USV within the next 10 Business Days.

In addition, National Grid NTS will aim to lessen the impact of the event of default by rejecting any further applications for QSEC capacity by the User, until the necessary security is put in place.

In the event that the User has not met the conditions of the notice after 10 Business Days, or in the event that the User has been terminated under UNC TPD Section V, then the User’s QSEC capacity holding across all ASEPs in Years Y2 to Y16 will be cancelled and the User charged a cancellation fee equivalent to the User’s security held for the purposes of underwriting the User’s holding of NTS Entry Capacity for Years Y+2 to Y+16 inclusive as proposed in this proposal. As a further appropriate sanction, National Grid NTS will also reject any further applications made to acquire System Capacity under Section B or via a System Capacity Trade in which the User is a Transferee User until the following Day after the bids are allocated by National Grid in the next QSEC auction.

Where a User fails to provide or maintain the security required by this proposal the User’s prevailing QSEC capacity holding across all ASEPs in Years Y+2 to Y+16 that has been previously subject to Transfer will be treated as though the User had been terminated under UNC TPD Section B5.4. i.e. the Transferee User may elect to be registered as holding the Capacity and subsequently liable for Capacity Charges in respect of the transferred capacity.

Following application of Section B5.4 any remaining cancelled NTS Entry Capacity will be offered in subsequent capacity auctions and treated as unsold capacity.

It is proposed that any revenues accumulating from the cancellation fee and any new Allocated Capacity Values from the resale or B5.4 process will be combined and compared to the expected revenue. It is anticipated that National Grid NTS will need to consult on the Charging Methodology to define the cancellation fee and consequential recalculation of the existing charges which will be considered as part of the actual revenue assessment.

2 **Extent to which implementation of the proposed modification would better facilitate the relevant objectives**

Standard Special Condition A11.1 (a): the efficient and economic operation of the pipe-line system to which this licence relates;

Implementation would discourage speculative auction bidding, thus reducing the risk of inefficient system investment and provides an incentive for Users to honour entry capacity auction commitments. This in turn will give National Grid NTS and the shipper community greater assurance over the appropriateness of any associated system developments and/or allowed revenue returns.

Standard Special Condition A11.1 (b): so far as is consistent with subparagraph (a), the coordinated, efficient and economic operation of

(i) the combined pipe-line system, and/ or

(ii) the pipe-line system of one or more other relevant gas transporters;

Implementation would not be expected to better facilitate this relevant objective.

Standard Special Condition A11.1 (c): so far as is consistent with subparagraphs (a) and (b), the efficient discharge of the licensee's obligations under this licence;

Implementation would provide an incentive on Users to book Quarterly NTS Entry Capacity only when required. This would reduce the potential for providing unnecessary physical NTS capacity.

By requiring Users to underwrite their anticipated allocation of capacity prior to a QSEC auction and subsequently maintain this underwriting implementation would provide an appropriate level of incentive on Users not to bid in such auctions in a speculative manner. By discouraging such speculative bidding, implementation would also minimise the risk of speculative bidding influencing the outcome of the auction process thus reducing the potential for inefficient outcomes.

Any arrangement, such as the current position within the UNC, which maintains the ability for a User's QSEC auction bids to be considered during the auction allocation process and then subsequently provides an opportunity for the User to decline to take up the capacity allocated (by, for example, not subsequently providing the required security to underwrite that allocated capacity), increases the potential for speculative bidding and the associated adverse effects on the efficiency of the auction signals given. Such arrangements are therefore less optimal in terms of both this relevant objective and A11.1 (d).

Standard Special Condition A11.1 (d): so far as is consistent with subparagraphs (a) to (c) the securing of effective competition:

(i) between relevant shippers;

(ii) between relevant suppliers; and/or

(iii) between DN operators (who have entered into transportation arrangements with other relevant gas transporters) and relevant shippers;

Implementation, whilst extending the credit arrangements, would potentially reduce the exposure on Users as a whole to one or more Users failing to pay for their NTS Entry Capacity holdings (referred to below as “defaulting”), without introducing a prohibitive cost to Users who may wish to take part in the NTS Entry Capacity auctions. Implementation would ensure that costs and User default risks are allocated appropriately across all Users.

As described in the A11.1 (c) section above, arrangements which maintain the ability for a User’s QSEC auction bids to be considered during the auction allocation process and then subsequently provide an opportunity for the User to decline to take up the capacity allocated (by, for example, not subsequently providing the required security to underwrite that allocated capacity), increases the potential for speculative bidding. Such a situation increases the potential for a, subsequently “defaulting”, User to unduly influence the bidding arrangements of other Users in the QSEC auction and the subsequent capacity allocations. Such arrangements are less optimal than those proposed in relation to this relevant objective.

Implementation, however, by requiring security to be provided prior to the allocation of NTS Entry Capacity, particularly at new ASEPs, would potentially inhibit onshore and offshore developments due to the reluctance of financial institutions to underwrite the purchase of NTS Entry Capacity prior to commitment by National Grid NTS that such capacity will be delivered. This would not be expected to facilitate the achievement of this Relevant Objective.

Standard Special Condition A11.1 (e): so far as is consistent with subparagraphs (a) to (d), the provision of reasonable economic incentives for relevant suppliers to secure that the domestic customer supply security standards... are satisfied as respects the availability of gas to their domestic customers;

Implementation would not be expected to better facilitate this relevant objective.

Standard Special Condition A11.1 (f): so far as is consistent with subparagraphs (a) to (e), the promotion of efficiency in the implementation and administration of the network code and/or the uniform network code;

Implementation would not be expected to better facilitate this relevant objective.

3 The implications of implementing the Modification Proposal on security of supply, operation of the Total System and industry fragmentation

Insofar as security of supply may be enhanced by onshore and offshore developments financed by small Users, which would not be considered by larger Users, implementation might affect security of supply. This assumes that

certain small Users would be inhibited from developing projects due to difficulties in obtaining security from financial institutions prior to obtaining guarantees of NTS Entry Capacity.

4 The implications for Transporters and each Transporter of implementing the Modification Proposal, including:

a) Implications for operation of the System:

No implications have been identified.

b) Development and capital cost and operating cost implications:

This Proposal seeks to ensure that any investment in the NTS is efficient and economic by requesting an appropriate level of User Commitment, which should not unduly discourage Users from bidding for unsold baseline and triggering non-obligated or incremental capacity.

This Proposal also seeks to provide an incentive for Users to honour existing and future capacity auction commitments and ensure that any investment in the NTS is efficient and economic. This would be reflected in the Transporter's development and capital costs.

c) Extent to which it is appropriate to recover the costs, and proposal for the most appropriate way to recover the costs:

It is considered that any changes to UK Link resulting from implementation would be funded via a "User pays" approach. A ROM has been requested. And it is proposed that development and implementation costs should be funded 100% by Users in proportion to:

Total implementation and development costs * (User's ACV divided by the sum of all User's ACV)

The ACVs to be used in the above calculation shall be the ACVs applicable on the date of the implementation of this proposal.

These sums will be invoiced over the remainder of the Gas Year following implementation of this Proposal.

d) Analysis of the consequences (if any) this proposal would have on price regulation:

No such consequences have been identified.

5 The consequence of implementing the Modification Proposal on the level of contractual risk of each Transporter under the Code as modified by the Modification Proposal

No such consequences have been identified.

6 The high level indication of the areas of the UK Link System likely to be affected, together with the development implications and other implications for the UK Link Systems and related computer systems of

each Transporter and Users

A full assessment has not yet been conducted but National Grid NTS believes there will be system impacts as a result of having to carry out the entry capacity default process.

7 The implications of implementing the Modification Proposal for Users, including administrative and operational costs and level of contractual risk

Administrative and operational implications (including impact upon manual processes and procedures)

For those Users participating in the QSEC auctions, these Users will probably need to adjust their administrative arrangements to reflect the User Commitment arrangements proposed so that they are able to assess its credit requirements and ensure a Deposit Deed or Letter of Credit is in place at all times to match its capacity holdings.

Implementation would have implications for single ASEP Users as they will need to provide security and pay for capacity that they have committed to in the QSEC auctions. The requirement to pay will be regardless of whether or not they are in a position to utilise the capacity they have booked.

Development and capital cost and operating cost implications

The aggregate level of security to be provided by Users as a result of the implementation of this proposal is expected to be in the region of £65m (5.5% of all Allocated Capacity Values (ACV)), which would equate to an estimated Letter of Credit cost across all Users of around £1.6m to £3m per year. This estimate is based on a LoC cost range - 1% LoC face value for AAA User's rising to 7% for User's with no credit rating.

However, Users with poor credit ratings may choose to use a deposit deed as a cheaper option, as the amount deposited is currently subject to bi-annual interest payments equal to Bank of England base rate.

There will be cost implications in extending the security arrangements. It is considered that the costs incurred from implementing this proposal would be offset by the benefits accrued from mitigating the risk of a User's failure to pay NTS Entry Capacity charges.

Review Group 0221 carefully considered the balance between the introduction of costs and the mitigation of User "default" risk. Review Group 0221 resolved that operating costs in the region of those anticipated by this proposal (£1.6m to £3m) are reasonable when compared to the Shipper community bearing the full cost of a project failure or User "default". Given events since the introduction of Network Code National Grid NTS has estimated the costs of project or User default to be in the region of £20m per year. This is based on events such as the failure of Enron and the recent refusal of planning permission for the Fleetwood storage project.

Consequence for the level of contractual risk of Users

This Proposal seeks to strike an appropriate balance between capturing an efficient level of User commitment and mitigating the shipper community's risk from a User's failure to pay NTS Entry Capacity charges.

Implementation would mitigate Users' risks due to a single User's default, whilst at the same time not creating an undue barrier to entry or adversely impacting on the amount of capacity purchased through long term auctions and the long term investment singles that these auctions seek to provide.

Using all years between Y+2 and Y+16 to calculate the ACV and reducing it to a proportion of 10% ensures the overall level of security required is proportionate to the problem and does not discourage Users from providing long term auction signals.

This proposal seeks to mitigate the risk to Users as a whole of a User failing to pay NTS Entry Capacity charges, by removing the current ability for ASEP User's to allow their capacity to lapse.

8 The implications of implementing the Modification Proposal for Terminal Operators, Consumers, Connected System Operators, Suppliers, producers and, any Non Code Party

No such consequences have been identified.

9 Consequences on the legislative and regulatory obligations and contractual relationships of each Transporter and each User and Non Code Party of implementing the Modification Proposal

No such consequences have been identified.

10 Analysis of any advantages or disadvantages of implementation of the Modification Proposal

Advantages

- Users will continue to signal sufficiently far in advance to allow National Grid NTS to make appropriate investment decisions.
- Lessens the risk of exposure of all Users to, an event of one of more Users failing to pay NTS Entry Capacity charges
- Discourages speculative auction bidding, thus reducing the risk of inefficient system investment and minimising any adverse impact on other Users bidding for capacity at the same ASEP in the same QSEC auction
- Provides an incentive for Users to honour existing and future QSEC auction commitments

Disadvantages

- Users may feel that their capital is tied up in the provision of the additional User Commitment which prevents other use of these funds. The provision of Letters of Credit or Deposit Deed will also come at a cost to the User.
- Projects could be delayed or cancelled as a result of the new User

Commitment required.

- Users may use the opportunity provided by the implementation of this proposal to withdraw from their current capacity commitments.
- Users would no longer have the benefit of Registered Quarterly NTS Entry Capacity lapsing in the event that security is not put in place.

11 Summary of representations received (to the extent that the import of those representations are not reflected elsewhere in the Modification Report)

None.

12 The extent to which the implementation is required to enable each Transporter to facilitate compliance with safety or other legislation

Implementation is not required to enable each Transporter to facilitate compliance with safety or other legislation.

13 The extent to which the implementation is required having regard to any proposed change in the methodology established under paragraph 5 of Condition A4 or the statement furnished by each Transporter under paragraph 1 of Condition 4 of the Transporter's Licence

Implementation is not required having regard to any proposed change in the methodology established under paragraph 5 of Condition A4 or the statement furnished by each Transporter under paragraph 1 of Condition 4 of the Transporter's Licence.

14 Programme for works required as a consequence of implementing the Modification Proposal

No programme for works would be required as a consequence of implementing the Modification Proposal.

15 Proposed implementation timetable (including timetable for any necessary information systems changes and detailing any potentially retrospective impacts)

16 Implications of implementing this Modification Proposal upon existing Code Standards of Service

No implications of implementing this Modification Proposal upon existing Code Standards of Service have been identified.

17 Recommendation regarding implementation of this Modification Proposal and the number of votes of the Modification Panel

18 Transporter's Proposal

This Modification Report contains the Transporter's proposal to modify the Code and the Transporter now seeks direction from the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority in accordance with this report.

19 Text

None provided

20 Recommendation

This Workstream Report is presented for the UNC Modification Panel's consideration. The Transmission Workstream considers that the Proposal is sufficiently developed and should now proceed to the Consultation Phase, with the proviso that National Grid NTS provides the Panel with analysis of costs and benefits, and details the proposed User Pays arrangements. Having noted that National Grid NTS expect legal text to be issued during the consultation period, the Workstream does not recommend that the Panel requests the preparation of legal text for this Modification Proposal.