

SO incentives from 2013

2 February 2012



Context

- We published a consultation on the principles and policy for SO regulation from SO 2013 this week
- The document set out our views at a high level on regulation of the SO from 1 April 2013
- The consultation period will run for eight weeks and should be emailed to soincentives@ofgem.gov.uk
- If you have any questions on SO regulation following this meeting please contact mathieu.pearson@ofgem.gov.uk or lisa.martin@ofgem.gov.uk



Objectives for SO and TO regulation

 Overall objectives for SO and TO are very similar, therefore propose common approach to regulation

RIIO-T1

- 1. To play a full role in the delivery of a sustainable energy sector.
- To do so in a way that delivers value for money for existing and future consumers.

SO2013

- 1. To play a full and active role in the delivery of a sustainable energy sector (integrated with the EU market).
- 2. To operate electricity and gas systems at value for money for existing and future consumers.

Common principles for monopoly regulation

Aligned objectives

SOs and TOs face similar challenges and uncertainties meeting these objectives



What we mean by "SO"?

SO core responsibilities

(covered by SO incentives)

Delivery of reliable and economical system operations - e.g. system balancing and constraint management

SO additional responsibilities

(mostly not covered by current SO incentives, some addressed by RIIO:T1)

- Wide range of additional responsibilities include:
- facilitating connections,
- system planning (with TOs)
- charging
- providing information to the market

SOs and TOs' roles overlap in a number of areas

- Boundaries between SO and TO not always clear
- SOs & TOs have joint responsibility in a number of areas



What do we want SO to do?

Take a proactive approach, e.g. in connections, demand side response etc

Anticipate future developments and facilitate a smooth transition to a sustainable energy sector

Deliver long term value for money in system operations



Overview of SO regulatory framework from April 2013

- Principles, policy and objectives set for 8 years
 - Some incentive schemes may be set for shorter periods but overarching approach will not change
- Output incentive schemes
 - The SO regulatory frameworks will be outputs led
 - We have set out what outputs the SOs will be held to account to deliver and how we will incentivise them
- Cost incentive schemes
 - The SOs will be incentivised to deliver outputs at long term value for money though cost incentive schemes with associated cost targets
- SO-TO interactions
 - The frameworks will encourage the SOs to work with the TOs to identify behavioural changes that could result in overall lower costs of output delivery for consumers
 - The framework will promote transparency of interactions between SOs and TOs



SO role: the known unknowns

• The role of the SO in EMR

- In the technical update published by DECC has indicated the SO will be the body responsible for delivery of FIT CfDs and capacity mechanism
- DECC has announced the launch of a joint DECC/Ofgem project on the conflicts of interest and synergies between the new and existing SO functions and other National Grid businesses, this work may have implications for SO incentives
- Ofgem's mandate to review gas security of supply may lead to changes to the role of the gas SO
- Potential changes to the SO role from conclusion of joint DECC/Ofgem coordination project
- All of these issues require substantial work during 2012 and conclusions may not be clear in time to incorporate in SO 2013 proposals
- In cases of significant change, regulatory framework will need to be able to adapt accordingly



Appendix: SO incentives from 2013

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Electricity SO outputs

Balanced system

Connections

Provision of

Safety

Environmental

Stakeholders

availability

Gas SO outputs

Balanced system

Connections

Stakeholders

Safety

Provision of

Environmental

availability



Cost Schemes

Electricity		
	Scheme length	Cost target methodology
Total balancing	4+4	As per now, with
costs (bundled)		refinements of cost drivers
		and modelling

Gas		
	Scheme length	Cost target methodology
Shrinkage cost (bundled)	8 years	As now, volume forecast multiplied by reference prices
OM cost (bundled, with utilisation costs potentially carved out above a certain value)	8 years	To be determined, e.g. target could reflect past tender prices for OM with an efficiency factor applied
Potential	To be determined	
Balancing cost		

Timeline



