












UNC Modification	At what stage is this document in the process?
<h1>UNC 0805:</h1> <h2>Introduction of Weekly NTS Exit Capacity Auctions</h2>	<div style="display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 5px;"> <div style="border: 1px solid green; background-color: #28a745; color: white; padding: 2px 5px; display: inline-block;">01 Modification</div> <div style="border: 1px solid #17a2b8; padding: 2px 5px; display: inline-block;">02 Workgroup Report</div> <div style="border: 1px solid #9932cc; padding: 2px 5px; display: inline-block;">03 Draft Modification Report</div> <div style="border: 1px solid #ffc107; padding: 2px 5px; display: inline-block;">04 Final Modification Report</div> </div>
<p>Purpose of Modification:</p> <p>To introduce Weekly NTS Exit Capacity Auctions to allow for more economic and efficient capacity bookings.</p>	
	<p>The Proposer recommends that this Modification should be:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Considered a material change and not</u> subject to Self-Governance • assessed by a Workgroup <p>This modification will be presented by the Proposer to the Panel on 17 March 2022. The Panel will consider the Proposer’s recommendation and determine the appropriate route.</p>
	<p>High Impact:</p> <p>None</p>
	<p>Medium Impact:</p> <p>National Grid NTS</p>
	<p>Low Impact:</p> <p>Users</p>

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Timetable			
The Proposer recommends the following timetable:			
Initial consideration by Workgroup	07 April 2022		
Workgroup Report presented to Panel	16 June 2022		
Draft Modification Report issued for consultation	17 June 2022		
Consultation Close-out for representations	08 July 2022		
Final Modification Report available for Panel	13 July 2022		
Modification Panel decision	21 July 2022		

1 Summary

What

UNC Modification 0752S - *Introduction of Weekly Entry Capacity Auction* which proposed the introduction of weekly entry capacity auctions was approved for implementation by the Uniform Network Code (UNC) Modification Panel on 21 May 2021.

Under the current arrangements for the booking of National Transmission System (NTS) Exit (flat) Capacity, Users are restricted to booking Annual or Daily NTS Exit Firm Capacity. It is proposed to expand the options available to Users by adding a weekly exit capacity auction to the suite of NTS Exit Capacity products.

Why

With the exception of NTS Exit Points connected to the Distribution Networks, Users shipping gas to Direct Connects have reduced annual NTS Exit Capacity holdings, choosing to optimise the capacity costs by acquiring daily products (both Firm and Off-Peak). Following the implementation of UNC Modification 0678A - *Amendments to Gas Transmission Charging Regime (Postage Stamp)*, even greater focus has been given to booking strategies as in a number of locations auction Reserve Prices have increased significantly.

At present, NTS Exit Capacity can only be bought on an enduring, annual, or daily basis. However, Users may wish to book a week of firm capacity rather than rely on Daily System Exit Capacity (i.e. preferring to “lock in” a volume of capacity for an extended period), for the following reasons:

- a) Mitigate against risks that Daily NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity is withheld by National Grid because of a perceived or actual constraint (whilst also increasing visibility for the System Operator); or
- b) want to purchase capacity ahead of the Gas Day for planning purposes; or
- c) reduce administrative costs and potential booking errors when managing daily booking processes

The introduction of a weekly auction product is likely to be an attractive proposition for Users and customers. A longer duration, such as a month, is unlikely to coincide with operational plans and management of costs.

How

This Modification seeks to implement a Weekly NTS Exit Capacity auction which allows Users an additional opportunity to book capacity more efficiently, outside of the current Annual, Daily and Daily Off-Peak products. The product will only be available to NTS Direct Connects (excluding Interconnectors), to the exclusion of DN Exit Points.

This proposed Weekly NTS Exit Capacity auction will run independently of the current NTS Exit Capacity auctions and is not intended to have any adverse impacts on the current auctions.

2 Governance

Justification for Self-Governance

~~Application of Self-Governance is sought because the changes proposed are unlikely to have an adverse effect on competition in the shipping, transportation or supply of gas conveyed through pipes or any commercial activities connected with the shipping, transportation or supply of gas conveyed through pipes.~~

~~The Modification is unlikely to introduces different treatment according to class of parties discriminate between different classes of parties to the UNC in that weekly NTS or Gas Shippers due to the changes having the~~

~~same impact on UNC parties as per the current rules for NTS~~ Exit Capacity Auctions will only be applied at NTS Direct Connect Exit Points, excluding Interconnectors. -

Requested Next Steps

This Modification should:

- be considered a ~~non~~-material change and not subject to Self-Governance.
- be assessed by a Workgroup.

3 Why Change?

Introduction

NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity is required to be purchased¹ to allow a User to offtake gas from the NTS and is made available through various NTS Exit Capacity Application Windows and auctions, which are prescribed within UNC TPD Section B3 (summarised within Table 1).

Following the implementation of UNC Modification 0678A², which changed the charging methodology associated with NTS Capacity, NTS Exit Capacity Reserve Prices have become uniform. As a result, Users saw significant changes to Reserve Prices at a number of locations and, we understand, have shifted focus towards booking capacity on a daily basis, aligning purchases with anticipated offtake quantities.

Table 1: Summary of NTS Exit Capacity (Flat) Application Windows/Auctions

Capacity Product	Product	Timeline	
Enduring Annual (EAFLEC) ³	Flat annual strips, evergreen	Y+4, Y+5 or Y+6	Obligated
Annual (AFLEC)	Flat annual strips	Y+1, Y+2 and Y+3	Unsold Obligated
Day- ahead (DADNEX)	Daily	D+1	Unsold Obligated
Within-day (WDDNEX)	Daily	D	Unsold Obligated
Daily off-peak (DONEX)	Daily	D+1	In accordance with UNC B 3.6.2

¹ Where a Shipper’s offtake quantity exceeds their exit capacity entitlement and the total amount of gas offtaken exceeds aggregate capacity entitlements then, they will become subject to overrun charges as per UNC TPD Section B3.13

² <https://www.gasgovernance.co.uk/0678>

³ A User may also request a reduction in Enduring Capacity holdings during the application window

Daily System Exit Capacity Auctions

Whilst the Daily Auctions allow for capacity to be booked at the day ahead or within-day stage, thus allowing capacity to be booked efficiently to reflect flows, National Grid may withhold capacity from sale at the relevant NTS Exit Point should it foresee a capacity constraint occurring⁴. We understand that National Grid does not in the ordinary course notify the market of any potential scale backs ahead of time. As a result, Users are only able to “lock in” capacity for use on a day by either buying annual capacity or trust that sufficient capacity will be available on a day-ahead basis. Given the cost implications of buying annual capacity for offtakes which exhibit variable consumption patterns, this strategy is uneconomic and will impose additional costs on the customer at the associated Exit Point. However, Daily Capacity may also be perceived as being less reliable for the reasons stated and Users and their customers may prefer to manage this risk by acquiring capacity for a duration longer than a day while “locking in” capacity in advance of day ahead.

Further, the current limitation of short-term products to daily capacity only is unnecessarily restrictive and out of kilter with the entry capacity regime. Although a monthly Exit Capacity product is unlikely to secure much support, a weekly product will, in some cases, align with customer consumption forecasts. A weekly booking cycle will reduce the administrative burdens imposed on Users (in booking daily capacity) and, as a result of reduced manual interventions, lead to less booking errors.

Shipper and customer benefits

Weekly Exit Capacity products will provide the following benefits to Users and consumers:

- Reduce availability risk of relying on day ahead capacity products
- Align with anticipated offtake forecasts and internal planning processes
- Reduce administrative costs and potential errors associated with running daily booking processes (resulting in, for example, Exit Capacity overruns)
- Increase National Grid visibility of week ahead bookings

Exclusion of Distribution Network Exit Points

Although the challenges faced by NTS Direct Connects can be applied to DNs several differences should be highlighted:

- Many Direct Connects are subject to greater variability and unpredictability in demand, due for example to activities in complimentary markets e.g. electricity markets
- The costs of acquiring NTS Exit Capacity are incurred by NTS Direct Connects. In the case of DNs these costs can be passed on to shippers (and ultimately customers) through DN charges as there are no explicit commercial incentives placed on DNs to manage NTS Exit Capacity costs
- DN licences oblige DNs to acquire NTS Exit Capacity to meet 1 in 20 demand conditions. Such an obligation does not apply to NTS Direct Connects

⁴ As per Chapter 4 of the Exit Capacity Release Methodology Statement: <https://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/gas-transmission/uk/electricity-transmission/document/135876/download>

- DNs will book capacity at a number of NTS Exit Points to ensure that, in aggregate, they meet their licence obligations and are able to satisfy connected demand, potentially making shorter-term capacity products less attractive.
- DN Exit Points contribute around 60% of total Forecast Contract Capacity. Any reduction in aggregate bookings (and subsequent revenue contributions) will have a greater impact on charges than equivalent changes to NTS Direct Connect booking behaviours
- Permitting DNs greater flexibility in capacity booking may create issues for National Grid NTS in its operation and planning of the NTS.

The analysis set out in Section 11 shows the impact of applying weekly auctions at DN NTS Exit Points. The scenario underpinning the analysis is somewhat subjective and cannot be relied upon to predict changes in booking behaviours, but nonetheless it does provide a sense of the broader charging impacts.

In short, the analysis shows that DNs, and their customers, would realise cost savings where weekly bookings were to be combined with annual bookings.⁵ In the scenario provided for Gas Year 2022/23, initial booking costs would be reduced by 54% and final costs by around 12% once the revenue under-recovery has been recycled through NTS Capacity Charges.⁶ The replacement of some annual bookings with weekly bookings at DN's, based on the scenario set out in Section 11 would generate a "revenue under-recovery" of £165m during Gas Year 22/23. If this is compared to NTS Direct Connects booking 50% of their historical bookings on a weekly basis, this would generate a "revenue under-recovery" of around £2m.

- Based on the differences between the classes of NTS offtakes, in particular the commercial incentives placed upon them, the prescriptive drivers on DNs to book peak capacity and the broader charging impacts, caused by revenue under-recoveries, on NTS Direct Connects of introducing weekly auctions at DN NTS Exit Points, it is proposed that the weekly product should only be made available to NTS Direct Connect Exit Points.

4 Code Specific Matters

Reference Documents

UNC TPD Section B: https://www.gasgovernance.co.uk/sites/default/files/ggf/page/2020-12/4%20TPD%20Section%20B%20-%20System%20Use%20%26%20Capacity_0.pdf

Exit Capacity Release Methodology Statement: <https://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/gas-transmission/uk/electricity-transmission/document/135876/download>

Knowledge/Skills

No additional knowledge or skills required.

⁵ It should be noted that the analysis does not consider a change to bookings at NTS Direct Connects.

⁶ In the analysis a Revenue Recovery Charge is generated to account for the revenue under-recovery caused by the DNs switching from annual to weekly bookings.

5 Solution

For this Modification to be implemented the provisions for a Weekly NTS Exit Capacity Auction would need to be included within UNC Transportation Principal Document (TPD) Section B, including:

- The capacity available at the Weekly NTS Exit Capacity auction is any Obligated Exit Capacity at any Direct Connect NTS Exit Point, excluding Interconnectors (but not DN Exit Points) that has not previously been allocated as Enduring Annual NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity or Annual NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity.
- The Weekly NTS Exit Capacity auction would take place between 08:00 and 17:00 at D-5 (where D is the first gas day of the weekly period, being a Monday).
- The Weekly NTS Exit Capacity allocation process take place on~~would be allocated by~~ D-4. For the avoidance of doubt, any unsold capacity would be included in the volume to be released via the Daily NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity auctions.
- National Grid will inform each User of those of capacity bids which have been accepted and the amount of Weekly NTS Exit Capacity which it is registered as holding before the start of D-3.
- Where a weekly period crosses two Gas Years, then the prevailing price on each relevant day will be used. For example, week commencing 27th September 2021 crosses the 2020/21 and 2021/22 Gas Year. In this example, 27th, 28th, 29th and 30th September would be charged at the 2020/21 reserve price whilst the 1st, 2nd and 3rd October would be charged at the 2021/22 reserve price. Where a weekly period does cross two Gas Years then National Grid will notify Users 5 business days before the auction is due to take place.
- Where one or more Days in a calendar week fall within one Gas Year and the remaining Days in that calendar week fall in the next Gas Year and the Remaining Available NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity in each of the two years is a different amount, the amount of Weekly NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity comprised in the capacity invitation shall be determined taking the lower of the Remaining Available NTS Exit (Flat) Capacity on each Day in the two years.
- For the avoidance of doubt, upon implementation the prevailing Reserve Price and a Duration Multiplier of one (1) (as prescribed within UNC TPD Section Y for the current NTS Auctions) will be applied to the Weekly NTS Exit Capacity Auctions.
- For the avoidance of doubt, the amendments to the UNC as proposed in this Modification shall not be applicable to interconnection points ("IPs"). The revised CAM Regulation (as retained in UK law in accordance with the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and amended by the Gas (Security of Supply and Network Codes) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019) governs the offering of capacity products at UK IPs. A weekly capacity product is not envisaged by the CAM Regulation. In order to permit the offering at IPs of weekly capacity products, the CAM Regulation would need to be amended, which would be a legislative process; authorising the offering of this new product at IPs is beyond the permitted scope of the UNC and therefore would not be achievable through a modification to the UNC. While the Modification may therefore result in differences between capacity products offered at IPs and non-IPs, this is reflective of the extent of the amendments that can be made by way of UNC amendment. It is also consistent with the implementation of UNC Modification 0752S.

- It is anticipated that there will not be any impacts on Day-Ahead Exit Capacity Auctions. Users are able to submit daily capacity bids at any time from 05.00 hours on D-7 until 00.00 on D⁷. Allocation of Daily Capacity commences at 15.00 on D-1. As the Weekly Exit Capacity Auction will allocate weekly strips on D-4, unsold capacity (for each day in the relevant week) will flow through to the Daily Capacity Auction allocation process.

6 Impacts & Other Considerations

Does this modification impact a Significant Code Review (SCR) or other significant industry change projects, if so, how?

No Significant Code Review or significant industry change will be impacted by this Modification.

Consumer Impacts

A Weekly Exit Capacity Product will enable Users to better align their capacity booking activities with customer needs, ensuring improved efficiencies and greater confidence that capacity can, and has been acquired to underpin customer flows. Currently, a User is only able to acquire Annual Capacity to provide customers with the assurance that capacity can be acquired on each day that it is needed, resulting in higher costs being incurred by the User and ultimately the customer.

Cross Code Impacts

No Cross Code Impacts identified.

EU Code Impacts

No EU Code Impacts identified.

Central Systems Impacts

It is anticipated that there will be System Impacts in the implementation of a Weekly NTS Exit Capacity Auction.

7 Relevant Objectives

Impact of the modification on the Relevant Objectives:

Relevant Objective	Identified impact
a) Efficient and economic operation of the pipe-line system.	Positive
b) Coordinated, efficient and economic operation of (i) the combined pipe-line system, and/ or	None

⁷ Note following the implementation of UNC Modification 0759 - *Enhancements to NTS Within-Day Firm Entry and Exit Capacity Allocations* on 24th April 2022 Users will be able to submit capacity bids up to 02.00 on D.

(ii) the pipe-line system of one or more other relevant gas transporters.	
c) Efficient discharge of the licensee's obligations.	None
d) Securing of effective competition: (i) between relevant shippers; (ii) between relevant suppliers; and/or (iii) between DN operators (who have entered into transportation arrangements with other relevant gas transporters) and relevant shippers.	Positive
e) Provision of reasonable economic incentives for relevant suppliers to secure that the domestic customer supply security standards... are satisfied as respects the availability of gas to their domestic customers.	None
f) Promotion of efficiency in the implementation and administration of the Code.	None
g) Compliance with the Regulation and any relevant legally binding decisions of the European Commission and/or the Agency for the Co-operation of Energy Regulators.	None

Relevant Objective:

- a) This proposal furthers Relevant Objective (a) as implementing a Weekly NTS Exit Capacity auction will provide Users with an additional opportunity to efficiently purchase capacity that better reflects their anticipated gas flows. This will enable National Grid NTS to commercially plan, operate and manage the NTS, therefore facilitating the efficient and economic operation of the NTS. By excluding DNs this ensures that National Grid NTS will have more confidence in the planning and operation of the NTS.
- d) This proposal furthers Relevant Objective (d) by allowing Users to book NTS Exit Capacity that better reflects their anticipated gas flows (versus the current Annual Capacity products). This will reduce the cost of acquiring unwanted NTS Exit Capacity, where the alternative of relying on the daily product is perceived to be an unpalatable risk. In the case of NTS Direct Connects, demand tends to be unpredictable and variable which requires shippers to book capacity at relatively short notice.

8 Implementation

The Modification should be implemented as soon as reasonably possible and is not required to be implemented at the start of a Gas Year, subject to UNC TPD Section Y 1.3.2 (j) regarding the publication of reserve prices.

~~As Self-Governance procedures are proposed, implementation could be sixteen business days after a Modification Panel decision to implement, subject to no Appeal being raised.~~

9 Legal Text

Text Commentary

To be provided by Transporters.

Text

To be provided by Transporters.

10 Recommendations

Proposer's Recommendation to Panel

Panel is asked to:

- Agree that Self-Governance procedures Authority Direction should apply.
- Refer this proposal to a Workgroup for assessment.

11 Analysis

Part 1. Impacts of DNs acquiring the weekly product

Waters Wye Associates performed analysis to quantify the impact on prices in a scenario where DN's were able to access the weekly product.

Based on information provided by Wales & West Utilities, a potential booking scenario for the purposes of assessing price impacts assumes that DNs profile NTS Exit Capacity bookings using a combination of annual and weekly tranches. Based on an assumption that the volume of annual bookings is equivalent to demand requirements on 20% of days (summer) with the remaining volumes booked on a weekly basis, the initial savings are 54% of the costs compared to booking the full peak day volume across 365 days.

Scenario – 2022/23 price impacts (54% reduction in DN initial costs)

NTS Exit Capacity Price = 0.0218 p/kwh/d

Total DN booking revenue: Peak Booking for 365 days = £317m

Total DN booking revenue: Annual + Weekly booking = £146m

Total DN booking revenue under-recovery = £171m

Revised NTS Exit Capacity Price (adjusted for under-recovery using RRC) = 0.03093 p/kwh/d

Total DN savings under this scenario = £38m

Part 2. Impacts of NTS Direct Connects acquiring the weekly product

Waters Wye Associates performed analysis to quantify the impact on prices in a scenario where NTS Direct Connects were able to access the weekly product.

Using an extreme assumption that NTS Direct Connects converted 50% of their Annual Capacity Bookings during the period 1 October 2020 to March 2022, the reduction in revenue collected by National Grid NTS would be around £2m per annum, or 0.5% of total revenue to be collected from the sale of Exit Capacity products.

Observations

The analysis is very crude as it assumes that all DNs will tailor their booking behaviours in the same way, reducing annual bookings for the majority of the year while “topping up” with weekly bookings during higher demand periods. Total cost savings to the DNs under this scenario, following the redistribution and recovery of the resulting under-recovery are in the region of 12% of the total annual peak day booking requirement. Given DN licences require bookings to align with 1 in 20 demand conditions and that there is no direct commercial incentive on DNs to manage costs, a mix of annual and weekly bookings consistent with this scenario is unlikely to be realised. Nonetheless, it is plausible that if the weekly product were to be made available to DNs that a combination of annual and weekly bookings could be acquired, reducing overall costs to DNs and their customers. For completion, it should be understood that any savings made by DNs would be recoverable from charges imposed on NTS Direct Connects.

Compared to the impacts of NTS Direct Connects accessing the weekly product, Part 2 of the analysis shows that even under an extreme scenario where 50% of annual bookings are replaced by weekly bookings, the resulting revenue under-recovery is immaterial (around £2m per annum).

